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VR

S E C R E T 230431Z MAR 68 CITE SAIGON 0323

22 MAR 68 IN 76575

DIRECTOR INFO  25X1

25X1

1. GENERAL WESTMORELAND INVITES COMMITTEE'S  
ATTENTION TO FOLLOWING:  
QUOTE: A. ON 10 JANUARY 1968 AT 1530 HOURS, GENERAL  
WESTMORELAND AND LTG WEYAND CONFERRED, AND IN VIEW OF THE  
INTELLIGENCE CERTAIN OPERATIONS THAT HAD BEEN PROGRAMMED  
IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES OF III CTZ WERE CANCELLED.  
LTG WEYAND WAS DIRECTED TO REDEPLOY HIS TROOPS IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH THE INTELLIGENCE AND TO MOVE THEM CLOSER IN TOWARDS  
SAIGON.

B. ON 15 JANUARY 1968, GENERAL WESTMORELAND CALLED ON PRESIDENT THIEU AND SUGGESTED THAT THERE BE NO TET TRUCE. HOWEVER, PRESIDENT THIEU WANTED 36 HOURS AND AGREED THAT 50 PERCENT OF THE COMMAND WOULD BE PRESENT AND AT A HIGH STATE OF ALERT.

C. ON 25 JANUARY 1968, AMBASSADOR BUNKER  
AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND CALLED ON PRESIDENT THIEU AND  
URGED THAT THERE BE NO TRUCE IN I CTZ. PRESIDENT THIEU

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AGREED.

D. ON 30 JANUARY 1968, GENERAL WESTMORELAND  
 CALLED ALL COMPONENT COMMANDERS, FIELD FORCE COMMANDERS  
 AND BG IRZYK DIRECTING AN 100 PERCENT ALERT. THE ATTACK  
 OCCURED ON 31 JANUARY. UNQUOTE.

2. PLEASE PASS TO DIA AND J-3; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
S E C R E T

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5. THE G-2 FELT HIS LIAISON WITH BOTH ROK AND ARVN WAS GOOD. GENERAL PEERS, HOWEVER, POINTED OUT KOREANS WERE SOMETIMES RELUCTANT TO PASS INFORMATION TO SOME ARVN UNITS, EVEN VIA UNITED STATES CHANNELS, BECAUSE OF WHAT KOREANS CONSIDER WEAKNESS IN ARVN SECURITY.

6. [ ] GAVE TEAM BRIEFING IN WHICH HE EMPHASIZED WHEAT-AND-CHAFF PROBLEM CONFRONTING INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WHO RECEIVE WEEKLY DELUGE OF ATTACK REPORTS, FEW OF WHICH ARE VALID. ALTHOUGH APPROPRIATELY CAST FOR II CORPS HIGHLANDS, [ ] PROVIDED IN PARA 8 OF HIS NHA TRANG 2613 (BEING POUCHED) A GENERALIZED ANALYSIS WHICH COULD BE APPLIED COUNTRY-WIDE. IN GIST, HE SAYS <sup>TH</sup>ERE SIMPLY WAS NOT ENOUGH INTELLIGENCE TO INDICATE THAT A COORDINATED AND SIMULTANEOUS ATTACK ON PROVINCIAL CAPTIALS WOULD OCCUR DURING TET PERIOD.

7. TEAM THEN WENT ON TO VISIT MG STONE, CG 4TH US DIVISION, WHO EXPLAINED HIS DIVISION WENT TO FULL ALERT ON 24 JANUARY AS RESULT OF INTELLIGENCE INDICATING IMMINENT ATTACKS ON KONTUM, PLEIKU, AND DAK TO. THIS INTELLIGENCE CAME FROM ALL SOURCE, INCLUDING ATTACK PLAN FOR PLEIKU

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(PARA 3 ABOVE).

8. WE NEXT MOVED ON TO PLEIKU AND ARVN II CORPS. AGAIN, DOCUMENTS AND PRISONER INTERROGATIONS INDICATED A COMING ATTACK IN HIGHLANDS. INTERROGATIONS OF PRISONERS TENDED TO CONFIRM THE CAPTURED PLEIKU ATTACK PLAN. ON 25 JANUARY PLEIKU WENT TO AN ALERT STATUS AS NOTED IN PARA 3. THIS REQUIRED ONE-THIRD OF FORCE TO BE IN BUNKERS AFTER DARK. ARVN ISSUED AN ALERT MESSAGE ON 29 JANUARY. AT TIME OF ATTACK ARVN HAD TWO DIVISIONS IN II CORPS AREA AT FULL STRENGTH AND TWO AT HALF STRENGTH DUE TET LEAVES.

9. LOCAL UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES FELT COOPERATION AMONG INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WAS GOOD IN II CORPS AREA.

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10. [REDACTED] PLEASE PASS TO DIA AND J-3; [REDACTED]

25X1

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SDO, CS/DO

21 Mar 68 IN 75051

SECRET 211031Z MAR 68 CITE SAIGON 0252

25X1

25X1

DIRECTOR INFO

[Redacted]

1. FIRST VISIT ON 20 MARCH WAS TO III CORPS HEADQUARTERS WHERE TEAM BRIEFED BY SENIOR ADVISOR, COL PETERS, AND G-2 ADVISOR, LC KIZIRIAN .

2. COL PETERS STATED OFFENSIVE WAS EXPECTED EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER TET. AS IN OTHER INSTANCES, NOTHING PINPOINTED EXACT NATURE OF ATTACK UNTIL 30 JANUARY WHEN A PRISONER SAID FOLLWOING DAY TAN SON NHUT, OTHER MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE CORPS AREA AND SAIGON CITY WOULD BE HIT. ALERTING MESSA<sup>g</sup>GES HAD ALREADY GONE TO ARVN FROM III CORPS, BUT ARVN TROOPS WERE AT ABOUT 50 PERCENT STRENGTH BECAUSE OF TET.

3. THERE WERE NO REPORTS FROM CIVILIANS PASSED TO THE III CORPS ADVISORS; BUT, AGAIN, POINT WAS MADE THAT THERE WERE NO MEANS OF COMMUNICATION ONCE VC HAD MOVED IN.

4. III CORPS FELT MOST SIGNIFICANT EARLY WARNING WAS REORGANIZATION OF VC COMMAND STRUCTURE IN THE CORPS AREA.

5. [Redacted] BIEN HOA POINTED OUT THAT, WITH THE SITUATION

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AS IT WAS IN THE CORPS AREA BEFORE THE OFFENSIVE, CONTROL OF THE POPULATION WAS NOT THE SORT THAT ENCOURAGED PASSAGE OF INFORMATION. THERE ARE NOW 80 RD TEAMS IN PLACE AND 50 DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING CENTERS.

6. TEAM THEN VISITED II FIELD FORCE WHERE IT WAS BRIEFED BY COL FOULK, G-2. AS IN OTHER BRIEFINGS, COL FOULK STATED THAT ATTACKS WERE ANTICIPATED, BUT THE PRECISE FORM THEY WOULD TAKE WAS THE UNKNOWN FACTOR. THE FIELD FORCE WATCHED THE INDICATORS BUILD AND, ON 29 JAN, GEN WEYAND SENT A FLASH ALERTING MESSAGE WARNING ALL HIS COMMAND ELEMENTS THAT AN ATTACK ON FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS COULD BE EXPECTED DURING THE NIGHT OF 29-30 JANUARY.

7. COL FOULK FELT HIS INTELLIGENCE WAS GOOD. HE REMARKED THAT ARVN III CORPS G-2 DID NOT BELIEVE AN ATTACK WAS IMMINENT.

8. TEAM NEXT WENT TO CAN THO FOR A IV CORPS BRIEFING. MG ECKHARDT, SENIOR ADVISOR, ATTENDED. IN THE BRIEFING IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN INDICATIONS SOMETHING WAS BUILDING AS EARLY AS OCTOBER WITH NO SPECIFIC INDICATION OF THE TARGETS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THERE IS NO REAL

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25X1

[REDACTED] CAPABILITY IN THIS CORPS AREA.

9. AS WAS THE CASE IN III CORPS, ARVN WAS CELEBRATING TET AND WAS WELL UNDER STRENGTH.

10. IT WAS NOTED HERE, AS IT HAS BEEN ELSEWHERE, THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE NOT THE SORT THAT ENCOURAGED CIVILIAN REPORTING -- IT WAS TET; THE NUMBER OF STRANGERS IN THE VILLAGES WAS NOT UNUSUAL (FOR YEARS VC HAVE COME INTO TOWN FOR THE CELEBRATIONS, SINGLY AND IN GROUPS - ON FOOT AND IN SAMPANS); AND ONCE THE VC MOVED, IT WAS DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS FOR ANYONE WHO MIGHT BE WILLING TO REPORT TO DO SO.

25X1

11. [REDACTED] CAN THO BRIEFING IT WAS AGAIN NOTED

THAT ARVN WAS FAR FROM READINESS. THERE WAS A DISCUSSION

25X1

OF [REDACTED] ASSETS, SOME OF WHICH HAD PRODUCED GENERAL WARNING --- IN ONE INSTANCE A GROUP OF VC SAPPERS WERE ROLLED UP AS A RESULT OF [REDACTED] OPERATIONS.

25X1

12. IV CORPS UNITED STATES' COMPONENTS ARE NOW ORGANIZING AN INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING CENTER AT CAN THO BASE.

25X1

25X1

13. [REDACTED] PLEASE PASS TO DIA AND J-3; [REDACTED]

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SECRET 200435Z MAR 68 CITE SAIGON 0191

DIRECTOR INFO ☐

25X1

20 MAR 68 1473895

**ACTION**

1. TEAM VISITED III MAF, ARVN I CORPS, PROVISIONAL  
CORPS VIETNAM, AND REGION I ☐ ON 19 MARCH. BRIEFING AT  
III MAF WAS CONDUCTED BY LG CUSHMAN AND STAFF, INCLUDING  
MG ROBERTSON, CG I MARDIV.

2. IN SUMMARY, GENERAL CUSHMAN FELT HE HAD AMPLE  
FOREWARNING; WAS ABLE TO KEEP UP WITH MOVEMENTS OF HOSTILE  
ELEMENTS, AND ACTED ACCORDINGLY. ALL AGREED THAT, ASIDE  
FROM DANANG, SPECIFIC VC TARGETS WERE NOT KNOWN, ALTHOUGH  
THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF INTELLIGENCE INDICATING SOMETHING  
WAS COMING AROUND TET. GENERAL CUSHMAN NOTED THAT ATTACKS  
ON CITIES WERE EXPECTED. DEFENSE FORCES HAD BEEN  
POSITIONED, HOWEVER, TO DEAL WITH DIRECT ATTACKS (FORCES  
WERE STATIONED ABOUT 3 KILOMETERS OUTSIDE CITIES).  
INFILTRATION WAS NOT ANTICIPATED ON THE SCALE USED BY THE  
VC.

3. AS FOR DANANG, IT HAD BEEN CLEAR FOR SOMETIME, ☐

☐ THAT THE CITY WOULD BE THE

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TARGET OF AN ATTACK; BUT AGAIN, THE PRECISE TIMING WAS NOT KNOWN.

4. THERE WERE ONLY TWO KNOWN REPORTS OF CIVILIANS VOLUNTEERING INFORMATION. GENERAL CUSHMAN NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT VILLAGERS HAD NO MEANS OF COMMUNICATING ONCE THE VC HAD MOVED IN.

5. THERE WAS NO TET TRUCE IN I CORPS AND ALL UNITS, INCLUDING ARVN AND ROK MARINES, WERE ON FULL ALERT STATUS. GENERAL CUSHMAN FEELS COOPERATION AMONG THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN THE CORPS AREA WAS GOOD.

6. THE III MAF G-3 SAID HE FELT HE HAD AMPLE INTELLIGENCE FOR HIS PURPOSES. BOTH HE AND GENERAL ROBERTSON NOTED THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SPREAD FORCES TO COVER ALL POSSIBLE TARGETS WHEN EXACT ENEMY INTENTIONS ARE NOT KNOWN.

25X1

7. MEMBERS OF THE TEAM VISITED \_\_\_\_\_  
WHERE \_\_\_\_\_ BRIEFED ON THE FOLLOWING PROGRAMS:

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METHODS OF HANDLING AND COORDINATING INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED

25X1

[ ] AND FROM OTHER [ ] SOURCES WERE DISCUSSED

25X1

IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL AND IT WAS APPARENT THAT CLOSE

25X1

COORDINATION HAD BEEN MAINTAINED AMONG [ ] AND THE

25X1

UNITED STATES AND GVN MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

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8. [ ] PLEASE PASS TO DIA AND J-3; [ ]

[ ]

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SECRET 210335Z MAR 68 CITE SAIGON 0228

21 MAR 68 IN 75107

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PRIORITY ☐ INFO DIRECTOR

REF: HONOLULU 6725

(FN 78726)

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19 MAR 68 IN 73726

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CONTACTED STATION REQUESTING TO SEE

DURING SCHEDULED (REF) 23 MARCH

STOPOVER.

APPOINTMENT

CURRENTLY SET FOR 0930 23 MARCH WITH

25X1

LATTER WILL BE ELSEWHERE

ON TDY THAT DATE. SUBJECT DIRECTOR 81153.

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